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Student Notes
KILLING A SUSPECTED FELON FLEEING TO
ESCAPE ARREST*
There is little dispute that at common law a peace officer has no
power to arrest for a misdemeanor, without a warrant, except for a
misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the peace committed m his
presence or when there are reasonable grounds for supposing that a
breach of the peace is about to be committed or renewed m his presence.' Likewise, it is just as uniformly settled at common law that
an officer may arrest, without a warrant, a person whom he sees on
the point of committing or attempting to commit a felony,2 or for a
felony not committed in his presence, if he has reasonable cause to
believe that a felony has been committed, even though none, in fact,
has been committed. 3 And, of course, with a valid warrant, an officer
may legally arrest the person named therein regardless of the nature or
degree of the offense.
The amount of force that can be used in effecting an authorized
arrest gives rise to considerably more dispute. There is general accord
in the various jurisdictions that an officer may use force against force4
in effecting an authorized arrest, whether of a misdemeanant or felon.
Moreover, the law is uniformly settled that an officer is justified in
killing a fleeing felon, provided he has utilized every means within his
power to effect his arrest, and the killing is absolutely necessary to
prevent his escape. 5 On the other hand, it is just as uniformly established that an officer is not justified in killing a mere misdemeanant or
i%a companion, but contra, note to the one by Mr. Griffin, pp. 618.
, 114 Eng. Rep. 149 (1841); Cook v. Nethercote,
Baynes %.Brewster,2Q.B.

* 'his

6 C. & P 741. 172 Eng. Rep. 1443 (1835). Most states, by statutory provisions, have
provided that an officer may, without a warrant, arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his presence.
" Handcock v. Baker, 2 Bos. & P 260, 126 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800). See Allen v.
London and South Western Ry., L. R. 6 Q. B. 65 (1870).
3Jamison v. Gaernett, 10 Bush (73 Ky.) 221 (1874); Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend.
351 (N. Y. 1829); Beckwith v. Philby, 6 B. & C. 635, 108 Eng. Rep. 585 (1827);
Samuel v. Payne, I Doug. 359, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K. B. 1780).
4 Kammerer v. Comm., 140 Ky. 626, 131 S. W 486 (1910); State v. Bland, 97 N.
Car. 478, 2 S. E. 460 (1887); State v. McNally, 87 Mo. 644 (1885); Reg. v. Bull, 9 C.
& P 22. 173 Eng. Rep. 723 (1839).
- Head v. Martin, 85 Ky. 480, 3 S. W. 622 (1887); Carr v. State, 43 Ark. 99 (1884);
Conraddy v. People, 5 Parker Cr..Rep. 234 (N. Y. 1862); 2 BisHoP's NEW CRIM. LAW,
secs. 617 and 648 (9 ed. 1923); 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 489 (1778).
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an innocent person who is fleeing, at least where the officer has no
reason to believe him to be more than a mere misdemeanantY
There remains an area of some doubt, however. Suppose an officer
has every reason to believe, based on reasonable grounds, that a felony
has been committed, and committed by a particular person, and after
resorting to all possible means and remedies to effect the arrest of
that person, and failing in hIs efforts, fires and kills the fleeing suspected felon, only to learn later that no felony had been committed
and thus that the person killed was not a felon at all, but only a misdemeanant, or perhaps, an innocent person. Or, suppose that a felony
has in fact been committed and the officer has reasonable grounds for
believing that a particular person is the felon, and in order to prevent
his escape kills that particular person. only to learn that his victim was
innocent. Should the officer's reasonable belief that the person was
a felon, in either instance, justify the killing? It is the purpose of this
note to answer that limited question, with particular reference to the
Kentucky view 7
To appreciate the problem fully, it is desirable to take a brief historical look at the applicable law Even with the coming of the modern police system during the eighteenth century, police officers were
restricted to the powers of private individuals in making arrests without warrants;8 hence it is not surprising that as late as 1765 neither a
private person nor police officer could arrest, without a warrant unless
a felony had in fact been committedY The officer's power to arrest,
without a warrant, one who he had reasonable cause to believe had
committed a felony, even though no felony had been committed, stems
from the English case of 1780, Samuel v Payne,"' which seems to have
been the first case so to hold.1 i But the resulting enlargement of the
peace officer's right to arrest need not in theory, and did not in fact,
further result in an enlargement of the right to kill, although the right
to arrest a suspected felon on reasonable suspicion has been loosely
treated by some writers on the subject as a basis for the right to kill
a suspected felon on reasonable suspicion. Actually, the amount of
force which might legally be used in making arrests was from early
6Head v Martin, 85 Ky. 483, 3 S. W 622 (1887); 2 BisnoP's NEv CRIM. LAWV,
sec. 649 (9 ed. 1923).
"Arrests under warrants not separately discussed herein.
"Warner, Investzgating the Law of Arrest, 26 A.B.A.J. 151, 152 (19-10).
' Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a W1arrant, 49 H,\Rv. L. RPd:.
566, 570 (1936).
10 1 Doug. 359, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K. B. 1780).
n Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REr.
566, 570 (1936).
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times based upon the gravity of the offense involved. Thus, since at
old common law every felony was punishable by death, peace officers
were given the right to kill a fleeing felon, if m no other way the felon's
escape could be prevented.i" This rule was explained on the simple
ground that the felon had contracted for his own death by committing
the felony in the first place.
With the right to kill once established in the law, it was only natural that some controversial issues would arise. Some have felt that
the rule should be extended so as to permit an officer to kill even fleeing misdemeanants on the theory that submission to known officers is
essential to the safety of the community; while others felt that the rule
should be restricted to felonies committed with violence, and should
not include arrests for, e. g., grand larceny 13 It seems now generally
recognized that an officer is justified in killing a fleeing person only
when the person fleeing has in fact committed a felony, and there is
no other way his escape can be prevented. 14 However, there is some
authority'- for the view that an officer may justify killing a fleeing
misdemeanant or innocent person by showing that he had reasonable
cause to believe that the person had committed a felony, and the killing
was absolutely necessary to prevent his escape. In the Washington
case of Coldeen v Reid,1 an officer, believing that two boys were fleeing in a stolen automobile, shot and killed one of the occupants, they
having failed to stop upon the officer's command to halt. The trial
court sustained an objection to the admission of testimony of the police
officer that the conduct of the boys was such as to lead him to believe
that the car had been stolen. In granting the officer a new trial, the
appellate court said:
"When, therefore, an officer is called upon to answer for
a claimed unlawful arrest, or for excessive use of force in makang a

lawful arrest, he has the right to show the circumstances surrounding

the transaction, and the impression these circumstances make on his

2 BISHoP's NEw

CR*i.

LAW, sec. 649 (9 ed. 1923). See Head v. Martin, 85 Ky.

483, 3 S. W 622, 623,

, ORriFLD, CRIM. PROC. FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 26, 27 (1947).

"Johnson v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 259 Ky. 789, 83 S. W. 2d 521 (1935); Young v.
Amis, 220 Ky. 484, 295 S. V 431 (1927); Johnson v. Williams' Adm'r., Ill Ky. 289,
63 S. W 759 (1901); Wiley v. State, 19 Ariz. 346, 170 Pac. 869 (1918); People v.
Kilvington, 104 Calif. 86, 37 Pac. 799 (1894) (by implication); O'Connor v. State, 64
Ga. 125 (1879); People v. McCarthy, 47 Hun. 491 (N. Y. 1888), affirmed in 110 N. Y.
309. 18 N. E. 128 (1888) semble; Commonwealth v. Greer, 20 Penn. Co. Rep. 535
(Penn. 1898). See Mylett's Adm'r. v. Burnley, 163 Ky. 277, 280, 173 S. W 759, 760
(1915). There are other cases cited in the text which are in accord. 4 At. JUR.,
Arrest, sec. SO: 6 ANt. JUR., Homicide, sec. 235; 6 C. J. S., Arrest, sec. 13.
1' Union Indemnity Co. v. Webster, 218 Ala. 468, 118 So. 794 (1928) semble;
Coldeen v. Reid, 107 Wash. 508, 182 Pac. 599 (1919).
1, 107 Wash. 508, 182 Pac. 599 (1919).
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mind, and to have the jury charged on his theory of the case, unless,
of course, the circumstances were such that there could be no two
opinions concerning it. Here there were sufficient facts to make it a
question for the jury whether or not the officer had reasonable ground
to believe the deceased and Is companion were in the act of committing a felony, and in consequence was Tentitled to show what
unpression these facts made upon lis mind."'

In Union Indemnity Company v Webster,is an Alabama case, the
suspected felon was shot by officers when they saw him running from
a still which was in operation. It was held that, on the evidence, the
jury was warranted in finding that the suspect was not in fact guilty
of having committed a felony The appellate court stated that "It was
"l whether or not the officers
for the jury to say, from all evidence,
used more force than was necessary to arrest plaintiff. While the jury,
under the court's theory of the law, could have found that the officers
exercised only that force necessary to effect the arrest, it apparently
found that they had used more force than was necessary because the
officer was held liable on his official bond. It is interesting to note the
dissenting opinion of one of the judges, who said in part:
I aim not in agreement with so nmuch of the opinion
as holds that an officer attempting to make an arrest of one not
resisting, but fleeing, may shoot to kill or mami on mere well-grounded
suspicion that the person so fleeing is a felon. The law which gives
an officer the right to ill an escaping felon limits the right to cases
in which the officer has a warrant, or actually knows the person whom
lie is seeking to arrest is a felon, at the time he fires. " -'

The great majority of cases deny the officer protection if he mistakenly kills a fleeing misdemeanant or innocent person, however
reasonable may be his belief that the fleeing person is a felon. The
two leading cases are Conraddy v People,2 a New York case, and
Petrie v Cartwright,22 a famous Kentucky case. In Conraddy v
People, an officer had arrested, without a warrant, the deceased for
assault and battery upon his wife, constituting a misdemeanor, and
while on the way to the station house, deceased escaped from the
officer, whereupon the officer, in order to prevent his escape, shot and
killed him. In affirming conviction of the officer the New York Supreme Court said:
"It will be seen from the authorities that the rule is clear
and definite; that in no case where a simple misdemeanor only has
been committed, must an officer take life to prevent escape. The
17Id. at -

182 Pac. at 601.

18218 Ala. 468, 118 So. 794 (1928).
19 Id. at -- , 118 So. at 805.
lbid.
" 5 Parker Cr. Rep. 234 (N. Y. 1862).

114 Ky. 103, 70 S. IV 297 (1902).
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rule is unqualified. It matters not what may have been the belief
of the officer or the grounds of his belief. If be takes life, he does it
at his peril. If it turns out that the party killed was guilty of misdemeanor only, the officer must answer.
"The law is tenderly regardful of the sacredness of human
life, and even in cases of felony, will not permit it to be sacrificed
except in cases of imperious necessity."'
In Petrie v Cartwright, the case which established the Kentucky
rule, two men, apparently drunk, had rudely and shamefully insulted
deceased's wife and her companion. The deceased, upon being informed of the conduct of the two men, inquired of them as to why they
had insulted his wife. A scuffle followed. One of the men pulled a
knife, and knowing that he must flee for his life, deceased started to
run. An officer, having arrived on the scene, thinking that deceased
had committed a felony and was escaping, fired upon and killed deceased. Evidence showed that the officer had reasonable cause to
believe a felony had been committed by deceased, although deceased
had not, in fact, committed a felony
The trial court instructed the jury that if the officer believed in
good faith, and had reasonable grounds to believe that deceased had
committed a felony, and, after using all other available means to arrest him, it was necessary to kill deceased to prevent his escape, they
should find for the defendant.
The jury found for the defendant under these instructions and the

case was appealed. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in reversing the
judgment, said:
"The jury were warranted in concluding from all the evidence that Petrie had in fact committed no felony.
"We have been unable to find any common-law authority
justifying an officer in killing a person sought to be arrested, who
fled from him, where the officer acted upon suspicion, and no felony
had in fact been committed. The common law rule allowing an
officer to kill a felon in order to arrest him rests upon the idea that
felons ought not to be at large, and that the life of a felon has been
forfeited; for felonies at common law were punishable with death.
But where no felony has been committed the reason of the rule does
not apply, and it seems to us that the sacredness of human life and
the danger of abuse do not permit an extension of the common-law
rule to cases of suspected felonies.
The notion that a peace
officer may in all cases shoot one who flees from him when about to
be arrested is unfounded. Officers have no such power, except in
cases of felony, and there as a last resort, after all other means have
failed. It is never allowed where the offense is only a misdemeanor,
and where there is only a suspicion of felony the officer is not warranted in treating the fugitive as a felon. If he does this, he does so
at his peril, and is liable if it turns out that he is mistaken. He may
35 Parker Cr. Rep. 234, 239 (N. Y, 1862),
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lawfully arrest upon a suspicion of felony, but he is only warranted
in using such'force in making the arrest as is allowable in other cases
not felomous, unless the offense was in fact a felony."'"

This Kentucky case is an excellent example of the evil that would
result from a rule which would allow an officer to justify killing on the
grounds that he had reasonable cause to believe that his victim had
committed a felony The evidence showed that when the officer
arrived on the scene, one of the men was lying motionless upon the
ground, and the officer probably thought he was either killed or seriously wounded. This, connected with the fact that deceased was
fleeing, afforded the officer every reason to believe that the deceased
had committed a felony Yet, the deceased was merely trying to save
his own life, and, as the court pointed out, he had apparently failed
to hear the officer's command to stop. It behooves everyone to justify
the taking of life on grounds more solid than "reasonable mistake."
From the preceding cases, it is amply clear that an officer cannot
justify the killing of a misdemeanant or innocent person on the grounds
that he had reasonable cause for believing that a felony had been
committed, and that killing was necessary to prevent escape, unless
a felony had in fact been committed.
The question which immediately presents itself now is: should an
officer be justified in killing a fleeing person if a felony, in fact, has
been committed, but the officer mistakes the identity of an innocent
person for the felon? That question was squarely presented in the
Kentucky case of Johnson v Williams' Adm'~r 25 In that case the officers had a warrant for the arrest of Dave Browder for murder. The
officers, being informed that Browder was on his way to see his father,
waited at a road crossing for his arrival. Moments later two men were
seen approaching in a buggy, leading a gray horse. The officers had
been informed that Browder was riding a gray horse. They heard
what they thought was the voice of Browder in the buggy It was
dark. The officers claimed that they attempted to halt the two men,
but instead of stopping, they increased their speed, and in order to
prevent Browder's escape fired and killed the deceased. It turned out
that it was not Browder in the buggy, but two innocent young men.
The whole defense was based upon the theory that since the officers had a warrant for the felon's arrest, and since they had probable
cause for believing that, Browder was one of the occupants of the
buggy, they had the ngfit to kill if it was necessary to prevent the suspect's escape.
21114 Ky. 103, 109, 110, 70 S. NV. 297, 298, 299 (1902).

il Ky. 289, 63 S. W

759 (1901).
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Undoubtedly, the officers had every right to believe that Browder
was in the buggy, considering the fact that Browder normally traveled
on a gray horse, that he had been riding a gray horse on this particular
night, that they thought they recognized his voice, and the fact that
the buggy, instead of stopping, increased its speed. But the court said
that it was unnecessary for it to decide on the question of reasonableness, and went on to point out that if an officer has a warrant against
one, and under it arrests another, he is liable for the tort thus committed, and that he cannot justify the wrongful arrest by showing that
he believed, and had reasonable grounds for believing, that he was
arresting the proper party Therefore, the court pointed out, that if
an officer cannot in that way justify a wrongful arrest, much less should
he be permitted to justify the killing of another by showing that he
had probable cause for believing that he was shooting at the party
whom he was authorized to arrest. The Court concluded by saying:
"The law which gives an officer the right to kill an escaping felon certainly requires him to knov that he is the felon, not an
innocent party, whose life he is attempting to take." -'

Therefore, if an officer with a warrant for the arrest of a felon cannot justify the killing of an innocent person, however reasonable his
grounds are for believing his victim was the felon, a fortiori, an officer
without a warrant cannot justify the killing of an innocent person on
like reasonable grounds.
In Commonwealth v Duerr,2 7 the officer had every reasonable
cause to believe that his victims were felons. There, the officer had
been informed of the stealing and burning of automobiles in a nearby
neighborhood. A young man, who had been arrested for stealing
automobiles, informed the officer that he had an engagement to meet
two other young men at a certain time and place to discuss plans for
stealing more automobiles. The officer, accompanied by other officers,
proceeded to the designated place to await the arrival of the two designated criminals. Moments later, tvo men approached in a car,
and upon seeing the officers, reversed their direction and attempted
to escape, despite the fact that the officers were yelling "Stop." After
a considerable race, the men abandoned the car and escaped into a
dairy barn. The officers were in hot pursuit, and when it seemed as
if the men would not stop under any circumstances, the defendant
officer fired several shots, killing both men. It turned out that both
were innocent.
The defendant strongly asserted that he knew a felony had been
committed and that, therefore, he brought himself within the rule that
-lid. at 297, 63 S. W. at 761.
- 158 Pa. Super. 818-,.15 A. 2d 235 (1946).
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where a felony has been committed the killing by an officer of one who
has attempted to flee arrest is justified homicide. But to this, the
court said:
"The fallacy of that argument is quite apparent.

The

felony in question must have been committed by the person whom the
officer is presently seeking to arrest. Otherwise, if a felony has been
committed in the community an officer could shoot and kill an enperson, whom he might suspect of being a felon as in
tirely innocent
s
tis case."

Another defense in the same case was that since an officer could
arrest one upon the reasonable suspicion of a felony, even though he
was not guilty of a felony, he thus had the right to use such force in
arresting a suspect felon as if the person had in fact committed a felony
To this, the court aptly replied:
"An officer may lawfully arrest upon a suspicion of felony,
but he is only warranted in using such force in making the arrest as

is allowable in' other cases not felonious, unless the offense was, in
fact, a felony."

Thus, it is very clear, the mere fact that a felony has been committed does not justify the taking of the life of an innocent person, even
though the officer may have acted upon the most reasonable suspicion.
When it comes to killing, the "suspicion under which he acted must
prove to have been correct."3 0
CONCLUSION

To give an officer the discretion to act on his reasonable belief
would be to bring many misdemeanor cases within the rule, for in a
large per cent of the cases the officer could show that he had reasonable grounds to suspect the commission of a felony, and it would in
effect be left entirely to him to say whether he was proceeding against
a misdemeanant or a felon. Such a principle would not only be in
derogation of the common law rule of permitting an officer to kill a
fleeing felon only, but would virtually give an officer the right to fire
upon anyone who flees in the course of an attempted arrest. A law
that will permit of such abuse in its enforcement would result in more
evil than good, and must necessarily be rejected in any society
It is important not to lose sight of the basis for the old common law
rule which based the right of an officer to kill a felon on the theory that
since all felonies were punishable by death, then if only the life of a
felon had been forfeited, no net harm had been done. With the coming of statutory provisions doing away with the death penalty for
felonies, the tendency should logically be to restrict officers to the
right to kill in cases of felonies punishable capitally The Restatement
"Id. at--- 45 A. 2d at 289.
'Did.

at

Id. at

-- ,
-- ,

45 A. 2d at 238.
45 A. 2d at 239.
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of Torts subscribes to this view, 31 in that it would restrict the right to
cases of felonies committed with great violence. The State of Texas,
in recognition of the modern development of the law, passed a statute32 providing that an officer executing an order of arrest shall not in
any case kill one who attempts to escape, unless in making or attemptmg such escape the life of the officer is endangered, or he is threaened
with grave bodily harm. In applying the statute to a case 33 where a
police officer had killed a horse thief who was escaping after having
been arrested, the Texas court said.
"The law places too high an estimate upon a man s life
prisoner, to permit an officer to kill him, while
though he be a

unresisting, simply to prevent an escape."3
The average criminal has little knowledge of the law with all of
its ramifications. Consequently, the precise provisions of the law have
little effect on the criminal's submission to the law enforcement officials. On the other hand, if the law were extended to permit an officer to kill on reasonable suspicion, it would definitely open wider the
avenues to abuse by officers, while having practically no effect as a
deterrent for preventing criminals from fleeing.
The sacredness of human life is so great that an officer should resort
to killing only when to let the felon escape would potentially cause
grave harm to society With this limitation, an officer would not
have occasion to kill for any crime less than felony In the event there
is doubt as to whether or not a felony has been committed, it is submitted that the crime will not have been committed with such violence
as to warrant the taking of life under the above rule. Where a felony
has been committed and there is the slightest doubt as to the guilt of
the suspected felon, it is submitted that society will suffer less by the
temporary escape of the suspect, even if guilty, than it would by killing
him and thereby incurring the risk of killing an innocent person. The
placing of these restrictions on an officer would not do violence to the
generally recognized rule that an officer, in order to justify killing one
fleemg in the course of arrest, must prove that the person killed was a
felon, but it would have the important effect of discouraging the taking
of life in the absence of absolute necessity
DELMER ISON
3i REsrAJEMENr. TORTS, "Sec. 131. The use of force against another for the purpose of effecting an arrest of the other by means intended or likely to cause death
t%privileged, if (a) the arrest is made for treason or for a felony which normally
and (b) the actor reasonably
causes or threatens death or serious bodily harm
believes that the arrest cannot otherwise be effected."
-TFx. STAT.. PEN. CODE, art. 1212 (1936).
Caldiwell v. The State, 41 Tex. 86 (1874).
t
Id. at 98,

